In this paper, we study an incentive problem that arises between a principal and two agents because they value a real option differently. The real option in our model is a timing option. The agents have limited capacity to undertake projects, and each agent's capacity can be filled now or later. Because the principal cares about capacity in the aggregate but each agent cares only about his own capacity, the agents assign a higher value to the option to wait. As a result, agents sometimes withhold ideas from the principal. We show that decentralization can be a solution to this problem. Delegating assignment rights to an agent reduces the option value of waiting for the other agent sufficiently that he is willing to reveal his ideas.
Introduction
In this paper, we study an incentive problem that arises between a principal (central manager) and two agents (local managers) because they value a real option differently. The real option in our model is a timing option. The agents have limited capacity to undertake projects, and each agent's capacity can be filled now or later. Because the principal cares about capacity in the aggregate while each agent cares only about his own capacity, the agents assign a higher value to the option to wait. As a result, agents sometimes withhold ideas from the principal. 1 We show that a solution to this problem can be for the principal to delegate the decision rights for project assignment to one of the agents. That is, decentralized project assignment is sometimes preferred to centralized project assignment.
1 Those who keep quiet at faculty meetings are not necessarily devoid of good ideas. They may instead be trying to avoid a response from the dean of "good idea, why don't you run with it." The faculty member may prefer keeping himself free for other projects.
The theory of real options, which is primarily a theory of single-person decision making, has proven to be insightful in evaluating investments.2 The traditional static net present value (NPV) rule is expanded to include not only the passive NPV of expected cash flows, but also the value of options from active management. Active management allows a firm to defer, expand, contract, abandon, or otherwise alter a project at different stages during its operating life. Different projects provide a firm with differing degrees of flexibility. For example, a research project does not commit the firm to development or production. The decision to commercially develop a research project can be made contingent on the results of the research. Failing to account for the flexibility provided by a 2 According to Ross (1995, p. 101) , "when evaluating investments, optionality is ubiquitous and unavoidable. If modern finance is to have a practical and salutary impact on investment-decision making, it is now obliged to treat all major investment decisions asproject can result in undervaluation.3 This paper takes a multiperson perspective to the theory of real options and makes a connection between a timing option and the optimal assignment of decision rights within organizations. 4 We study a three-period model of a firm with a principal and two agents, A and B. At the beginning of the first two periods, each agent may or may not come up with a project idea. Projects take two periods to implement and can be implemented by either of the agents, but the agent who came up with the idea is better suited to implement it. The objective of each agent is to maximize the (expected) value of the projects he implements. The objective of the principal is to maximize the value of the firm, which is the sum of the values of the projects implemented by both agents. Managerial capacity is limited in that each agent can implement only one project during the life of the firm.
Limited managerial capacity leads to an option value of waiting, both for the principal and for the agents.5 In our setting there is a need to coordinate the agents' capacity options because they interact. The capacity options interact because assigning an agent a project in Period 1 destroys his option value of waiting, but increases the other agent's option value. This is because an agent's Period-2 idea can be assigned to the other agent. Because of the interaction, each agent maximizing the value of the project he implements does not always result in firm-value maximization. What is important in obtaining this result is 3 This insight led Merck to increase their research budget (Nichols 1994) . 4 Trigeorgis (1995, p. 27) suggests that "[e]xtending real options in an agency context" is a research direction deserving attention. Antle et al. (2001) also study a multiperson model involving options. In their model, a principal rations resources both to exploit the option feature of an investment and limit the agent's informational rents (slack).
5 An option to wait (defer) arises when investments are irreversible.
In our paper, the irreversibility stems from the fact that when new projects are realized, it is not optimal to abandon the initial project.
For example, projects can have a plant and harvest phase. Once planting is done, it is optimal to harvest. Irreversibility can also arise due to physical constraints, such as with an oil well. Accepting a project now (drilling a well) implies foregoing a project in the future (a well can be drilled only once in the same location).
that the agents' opportunity cost of implementing an idea differs from the principal's opportunity cost. In our model, the source of such a difference is the real option associated with limited managerial capacity.
Under centralized project assignment, the principal coordinates the agents' capacity options. The principal asks the agents to report their project ideas before she makes her assignment decisions. It is assumed that the principal cannot ex ante commit to a project assignment rule. For some Period-1 realizations, the principal wants to assign the best project to its proposer and keep the other agent free for the next period. It is this case that can lead to a goal incongruence. If the best project is only marginally profitable, the agent may prefer to conceal the project. Because the principal cares about the sum of the projects undertaken by the agents but each agent cares only about the project he undertakes, the agent's option value of waiting is higher than the principal's.
Consider hierarchically decentralized project assignment. Suppose an agent, say Agent A, is put in charge of project assignment. We can think of Agent A as a boss or a team leader because he both assigns projects and may implement a project himself. There are two benefits to decentralization. First, Agent A no longer has incentives to conceal his idea. When Agent A comes up with an idea, he does not have to worry about the possibility of being forced to implement it. Because he has the decision rights, he can assign his marginally good project to Agent B and keep himself free for a potentially better Period-2 project. Second, the option value of waiting for Agent B, who was not delegated the decision rights, decreases. Agent A has the authority to assign Agent B a project in Period 1 and to expropriate Agent B's Period-2 idea. As a result, Agent B reports truthfully in Period 1.
The cost of decentralization is opportunistic project assignment. A project is sometimes assigned to an agent other than the one best suited to implement it. We show that decentralized project assignment is preferred to centralized assignment if the efficiency loss from assigning agent i's idea to agent j is not too large.6 6 In a setting in which capacity is unconstrained, Prendergast (1995) highlights a similar cost of decentralized project (task) assignment.
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE/Vol. 48, No. 7, July 2002 Hierarchical decentralization is a common feature of many organizations. A frequently discussed advantage of hierarchies is that they result in fewer communication requirements than the alternative of centralizing all decision making.7 A frequently discussed disadvantage is the control loss associated with delegation. Melumad et al. (1995) provide a benchmark setting in which there is no such control loss. In our paper, the principal is actually better able to control the agents through a hierarchy than she could through centralized decision making. Putting an agent in charge whose preferences are different than the principal's is a substitute for the principal's commitment.
We also consider variants of our basic model. In particular, we extend the results to settings with continuous values and to settings with multiple (three or more) agents. Finally, we discuss ex ante differences in agents that affect which agent is optimally put in charge.
Model
Consider a firm that has a life of three periods and whose participants are a principal and two agents, A and B. At the beginning of the first and second periods, each agent may develop an idea for a project.
There are no new ideas in the third period. Projects take two periods to implement, and, once started, it is not optimal to abandon them. If the period-t project is not undertaken in period t, it is not available in future periods. If agent i implements his period-t idea, its value is denoted by Vt, i = A, B, t = 1, 2. Vt takes on a value from the set {VO, V1,... , VN}, Vo = < V1 < ... < VN. Vt = Vo denotes the event that 7 Hierarchies can also be an efficient way to distribute information processing, as in Radner (1993) and Van Zandt (1995) . the idea.) k = 0 represents the setting in which ideas are individual specific; agent i's idea can be undertaken only by agent i. k = 1 represents the setting in which each agent's idea can be equally efficiently implemented by either agent. The intermediate case, k E (0, 1), characterizes the setting wherein an agent who identifies a project is better suited to implement it. He is more familiar with the project, and communicating all details is costly or impossible.
Arrival of project ideas and project values are independent across agents and time. Also, the agents are assumed to be ex ante identical. Denote the probability that Vti = V by p,, pn > O, n = O, 1,... , N; i = A, B t=l,2.
The principal and the agents have von Neuman
Morgenstern utility functions and maximize expec utility. The principal's utility (payoff) is the value the firm, which is the sum of the values of the projec implemented by both agents. Agent i's utility is t value of the projects he implements. One interp tation of the agents' preferences is that they refl the slack (e.g., perquisites) he consumes. Each ag consumes a proportion of the value of the proj he implements as slack.8 Alternatively, the age preferences might reflect such considerations as t prestige, power, or external visibility associated w running important projects.9 8 If s is the fraction of the project value the agent consumes as s the agent's payoff is s times the value of the project he undert and the principal's payoff is (1 -s) times the sum of the value the projects undertaken by both agents. For any s, 0 < s < 1, t model yields the same conclusions as those obtained by igno s in the participants' utility functions (as in the text), since th just an affine transformation. 9 We do not explicitly model compensation. Yet another inter tation of the agents' preferences is that they arise from a com sation contract based at least in part on divisional performa Under this interpretation of our preferences, one might ques why the agents are not rewarded instead solely on the basi firmwide profits or paid for ideas. The typical response give the literature on incomplete contracts is that, because of o unmodeled sources of division-specific moral hazard, it is be to base agents' compensation at least partly on divisional pro As long as there is some division-specific component to pay agents will put their own division's interests ahead of firm value maximization. See Anctil and Dutta (1999) for a discu and an explicit analysis of divisional versus firmwide perform MANAGEMENT SCIENCE/Vol. 48, No. 7, July 20 Each agent has a limited capacity for projects. He can implement only one project over the life of the firm. This capacity constraint creates an option to defer filling capacity. It can be optimal for the agent not to implement a profitable project in Period 1 in order to keep himself free for a potentially more profitable project in Period 2.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the principal publicly either retains the decision rights for project assignment (the centralized regime) or delegates them to one of the agents (the decentralized regime). Second, at the beginning of Period 1, agent i learns V[ and either reports V[ to the in-charge individual or keeps quiet (reports VO). The only possibility of misrepresentation is that an agent may choose not to reveal his idea when he does have one.10 Third, the in-charge individual assigns projects to the agents.
There is no precommitment to follow a particular rule in assigning projects; no contracts are written.
Period 2 repeats the project arrival, reporting, and project assignment. The timeline in Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events.
The principal and agents make decisions that are dynamically optimal at the time they are making those decisions, correctly anticipating any simultaneous decisions of other individuals and all future decisions. When indifferent among actions, the agents choose actions that maximize the principal's expected utility.
Conditional on the Period-1 realizations of VA and V1f, the expected firm value under the centralized and decentralized regimes is denoted by rc (VA, VfB; k) and IrD(VA, V'B; k), respectively. The corresponding unconditional (prior to Period-1 realizations) expected firm values are denoted by nc(k) and HD(k).
evaluation. With respect to paying for ideas, we note that identifying the future benefit of an idea to the firm, or even the "true" source of the idea, is often difficult.
0 If an agent falsely reports the value of his idea and it is implemented, he would be found out.
Assuming each agent will be assigned his own Period-2 idea, agent i's option value of waiting is E[V2] = E n=pnV,, which we denote by V. If agent i is allowed to pick the best Period-2 project, his option value of waiting is E [Max(V2, kV21] 3. Equilibrium
First-Best Setting
The first-best setting is one in which the principal also observes Vt at the beginning of period t. In this setting, it is optimal for the principal to retain the decision rights for project assignment. The optimal assignment rule is determined using backward induction.
In Period 2, there is no reason to save capacity for the third period (there are no new ideas in Period 3). Suppose both agents are unavailable in Period 2 (i.e., they were assigned projects in Period 1).
In this case, the principal has to forgo all Period-2 projects. Suppose only one agent, say agent i, is available in Period 2. In this case, agent i is assigned his own project if V2 > kV2; otherwise, he is assigned agent j's project. Finally, if both agents are available in Period 2, each agent is assigned his own project idea.
The principal's first-period assignment rule needs to account for the option value of keeping one or both agents free. Conditional on Period-1 realizations VA and V,1, the first-best firm value, denoted rFB(VIA, V,; k), is:
The first term (VA + VB) corresponds to the principal assigning both Period-1 projects to their respective project proposers. The second term (Max{VA, V1B + V + 8(k)) corresponds to the principal assigning the projects in Period 1 and keeping both agents free for their own Period-2 ideas. The ex ante expected firm value is HB(k) = E=o Zn=O PmPnFB (Vm, V; k) 3.2. Second-Best Setting Now suppose that the principal does not observe project values. In this setting, there is no reason for the principal to consider delegating project assignment decisions if the agents have incentives to reveal their ideas. If the agents reveal their ideas, the firm value will be first-best; i.e., IIc(k) = lFB(k).
Withholding ideas by the agents is, however, an issue in the second-best setting because the agents value the option to wait differently than the principal does. The principal cares about the projects implemented in aggregate, while each agent cares only about the project he implements. Each agent may not want to undertake a Period-1 project that the principal would like him to undertake.
When agents have incentives to withhold ideas, the firm value will not necessarily be first best under centralization. We say there is a goal incongruence between the principal and agents if there exists some (VA, Vl) for which irc(VA, V1; k) 7 TFB(VA VlB; k). Otherwise, there is goal congruence. Proposition 1 presents the range of Period-1 values for which there is a goal incongruence in the central- The intuition for this result is as follows. For there to be a goal incongruence, the principal and agents must value the option to wait differently. A necessary condition for a difference in valuations is that the principal sometimes finds it optimal to assign ideas developed by one agent to the other agent for implementation. For k = 0, there is no reason to have one agent implement the other's idea, so there is no goal incongruence. The divisions are run as if they were separate firms.
For k = 1, the principal can commit to any project assignment rule because there are no mismatching costs. Hence, an optimal assignment rule for the principal is to implement the same projects as under the first-best assignment rule, but to treat one of the agents, say Agent A, as the favorite. That is, Agent A is assigned either the best Period-1 idea or kept free for the best Period-2 idea, depending on which is better for Agent A. This ensures that Agent A has no incentives to withhold his ideas from the principal.
Agent B, the unfavored agent, also has no incentive to withhold his ideas. If Agent A is assigned a project in Period 1, Agent B's option value of waiting is E[Max{V2, V2}] = V+8 (1), which is the same as the principal's option value. If Agent A is not assigned a project in Period 1, Agent B's option value of waiting is E[Min{V2, V2}] = V-8(1), which is again the same as the principal's option value.
Hence, both agents reveal their ideas and the same projects are implemented as under the first-best assignment rule. There is some mismatching, but with k = 1 the cost of mismatching is zero. Because the firm's expected profit is as under the first-best setting, there is no goal incongruence. Now consider the k E (0, 1) case. Assuming agent j is free for a Period-2 project, agent i's option value of waiting is V because the principal will assign each agent to implement his own idea to avoid mismatching costs. The principal's option value of keeping a second agent free for a Period-2 project is lower than V because the second agent's idea could have been undertaken by the other free agent if his own idea was not better. The principal's option value is 2V -
The difference in option values does not imply goal incongruence. If the Period-1 realizations are such that the principal wants to assign zero or two projects in Period 1, then there is no goal incongruence. In the former case, the option value of waiting is large enough (relative to the realization of first-period values), that both the principal and the agents want to wait. In the latter case, the option value is small enough that no party wants to wait. It is only for intermediate option values, i.e., when the principal wants to assign one project in Period 1 and keep one agent free for Period 2, that there can be a goal incongruence.
Comparing the three possible values for 7rFB(Vl, VB; k) implies that the principal wants to undertake the best Period-1 project and keep one agent free for Period 2 if: Min V1A, VB) <V + S(k) and
Both these inequalities are satisfied if Period-1 realizations are such that Max{VA, V1}B = Vm, where V-8(k) < Vm < V. In this case, a goal incongruence arises because the agent with the best Period-1 project is not willing to reveal his Period-1 idea. By withholding his Period-1 idea, the agent receives at least V, and V> Vm. If the condition in Proposition l(b) is satisfied, Ilc(k) < rFB(k). This allows for the possibility that decentralization may be the preferred organizational structure. A benefit of decentralized project assignment, relative to centralized assignment, is presented in Proposition 2. PROPOSITION 2. Under decentralized project assignment, the agent not in charge has no incentive to withhold ideas.
When the principal delegates the decision rights for project assignment to one of the agents, say Agent A, the option value of waiting for Agent B decreases sufficiently that he no longer has incentives to withhold his Period-1 idea. Agent B realizes that if both agents are available in Period 2, Agent A will pick the best project for himself and only assign the leftover project to Agent B. This reduces Agent B's option value of waiting. Note that this Period-2 assignment rule is incentive compatible for Agent A, whose objective is to maximize his own division's profits. It is not incentive compatible for the principal who cares for firmwide profits and, hence, wants to minimize mismatching costs.
Truthfully eliciting project ideas is the benefit of decentralization. There is also a cost. Decentralization increases the expected mismatching costs relative to first best (and relative to centralization). For example, in Period 2, even when both agents are free, the incharge agent will undertake the other agent's project if the in-charge agent does not have an idea of his own (or if his own idea is less valuable). Proposition 3 states that if the mismatching costs are sufficiently small, decentralized project assignment is optimal. The basic idea in the proof of Proposition 3 is to show that as k -1, the expected firm value under decentralization approaches the first-best firm value while the firm value under centralization is strictly less than first-best. That is, as k -* 1, the mismatching costs of decentralization go to 0, but the cost of the goal incongruence under centralization does not go to 0. Continuity arguments are then used to prove the existence of a nonempty interval of k for which decentralization is strictly preferred.
Proposition 3 suggests that maximizing firm value may require delegating the project assignment decisions to an individual whose objective is different than maximizing firm value, even when another individual whose objective is to maximize firm value is available. The in-charge agent's preferences (which differ from the principal's) allow him to credibly commit to assignment rules the principal cannot commit to (but would like to). This, in turn, changes how other individuals in the organization react. In our setting, there is also a more traditional advantage to delegating the assignment decision to an agent. The agent is better informed than the principal because he at least knows whether he himself has an idea. (In ?5.1, we isolate this advantage.)
Example
In this section, we present an example to highlight the intuition for our results. (See the last two columns in Table 1 
Relaxing Assumptionsl2
In this section we relax some of the assumptions in our model. 
Continuous Values Setup
Suppose Vt' E [0, Vu]. The continuous probability distribution function f over Vt, f(Vt) > 0, is as follows:
That is, with probability po, agent i is unsuccessful in coming up with an idea; with probability 1-po, the agent develops an idea. Given that agent i comes Note that since there are at most four ideas over the two periods, the availability of four agents guarantees that all ideas can be implemented. As alluded to earlier, relaxing the capacity constraint (from the principal's perspective) removes all friction in our setting.
With the relaxed capacity constraint, agents do not have any incentives to withhold their Period-1 project ideas under centralization. Hence, there is no need for the principal to delegate project assignment rights. To see why agents do not withhold their Period-1 ideas, consider the following argument. It is credible for the principal to commit to a Period-2 assignment rule under which agent i, i = A, B, is assigned a project only if he is free and has a project idea. In this case, agent i is assigned his own project idea. This assignment rule is credible (and optimal) because in Period 2, if agent j is busy and has an idea, Agent C or D is available and it is equally efficient to assign the idea to C or D.
Under the above assignment rule, agent i's option value of waiting is V. Hence, agent i is willing to reveal his Period-1 project idea if it is optimal for the principal to assign him a project in Period 1 if and only if the project idea is valued at least V. As we next argue, this is indeed the case.
Suppose V, = Vm. The benefit to the principal of assigning this Period-1 project to agent i rather than Agents C or D is (1-k)Vm. The cost of this assignment is that agent i's Period-2 idea will have to be implemented by an agent other than agent i. Project and Own Project Equally Recall that decentralization helps in our model for two reasons. First, assignment decisions are made by an agent whose preferences are different than the principal's preferences. Second, assignment decisions are made by an agent who is more informed (knows whether he himself has an idea or not) than the principal. To isolate this second, more traditional, advantage of decentralization we reconsider the example in ?3.3, with the only change being that we assume the boss cares equally for his own project and his subordinate's project; i.e., the boss has the same objective function as the principal.
Assume k = 0.95. The first-best and the centralized solution can be determined as before using Table 1. The decentralized solution is, however, different. This is because it is no longer credible for the boss (say Agent A) to commit to undertaking the best Period 2 project himself and leaving the leftover project to Agent B in the event both agents are available in Period 2. Agent B realizes that Agent A, just as is the case with the principal under centralization, will minimize mismatching costs in Period 2. This guarantees Agent B that he will be allowed to implement his own Period-2 project idea if he wants to. Hence, Agent B sometimes has incentives to withhold his Period-1 project idea.
In the example, under decentralized project assignment: (i) Agent B reveals his project idea in Period 1 if and only if its value is V2 and, in which case, Agent B is assigned the project, and (ii) Agent A undertakes his own Period-1 idea. The expected firm value under each of the regimes is as follows.
First-best expected firm value: 35.191 Second-best expected firm value under Centralization: 34.764 Decentralization: 35.049 In the example, it is better to delegate the decision rights to an agent than to make centralized task assignment decisions. The reason is that while Agent A has the same objective function as the principal, Agent A is better informed than the principalAgent A knows when he has tralization allows the firm to make better use of local information.
The Promotion Question
Our main result, Proposition 3, identifies conditions under which the principal prefers to delegate the decision rights for project assignment to one of the agents (i.e., promote one agent to be the boss) than to make project assignment decisions herself. Because the agents were (ex ante) identical, the principal was indifferent between promoting either of the two agents. In fact, one purpose of Proposition 3 was to emphasize that it may be optimal to treat even identical agents differently. However, it is also interesting to consider differences in agents that influence the principal's promotion decision.
The benefit of decentralization is that it allows the principal to elicit Period-1 ideas from the agents. This benefit arises because the in-charge agent's incentive to expropriate the other agent's Period-2 idea reduces the other agent's option value of waiting. However, expropriation can be excessive under decentralization.
Excessive expropriation manifests itself in the form of increased mismatching costs relative to first best. The principal's promotion decision optimally trades off the benefits of truthful elicitation with the costs of mismatching.
Several agent characteristics might affect this tradeoff, including differences in agents in their versatility (k-values), opportunity sets, level of optimism ("perceived" opportunity sets), and closeness to capacity constraint. In this subsection, we show that firm value is sometimes maximized by promoting the less versatile agent.
Let kj denote agent j's versatility parameter. If agent j implements agent i's idea the project value is kjVti. The more versatile the agent is, the higher is his k value.
Return to the numerical example in ?3.3 (with each agent caring only about the project he implements). Assume Agent A, but not Agent B, is perfectly versatile: kA = 1 and 0 < k < 1. Using the same arguments as given in the existing proof, Proposition 2 continues to hold. Given truthful revelation, Table 2 presents the Table 2 Throughout the paper, we assume the principal is not capable of (ex ante) committing to (ex post) adhere to a particular project assignment rule. However, in deriving Propositions 2 and 3, we assume she is capable of committing to delegating project assignment decisions to one of the agents. One reason the latter commitment may be easier to achieve is that different positions in a hierarchy are often associated with (and defined in terms of) well-specified decision rights. For example, by appointing an individual to the position of department chairman, the dean in effect commits to delegating the decision rights for teaching assignments of the department to the individual.
An alternative is to try to use information system design to ensure that delegating project assignment decisions to one of the agents is self-enforcing behavior for the principal. Suppose the principal establishes communication channels which allow for information (reports on ideas) to flow from one agent to the second agent, but not to the principal. Under such an information system, the principal effectively commits to delegating project assignment decisions to the in-charge agent because she does not even know whether the agents have come up with ideas or not. Of course, this information system design problem is not particularly interesting because the principal does not make any decisions. It might be useful to study the direction of information flows ("who-talksto-whom") as a commitment device in a richer setting (for example, hierarchical budgeting with reports that are aggregated as they move up in the hierarchy).
A limitation of our model is that the agents' effort in developing ideas and implementing projects is
unmodeled. An issue for future work might be to see how the control problem associated with unobservability of such effort interacts with the project assignment problem in the presence of limited managerial capacity. This might allow for more gains to decentralization: It might be easier to motivate an agent to exert appropriate effort if he is also delegated the project assignment rights.
Under this assignment rule, if agent j is available in In the remainder of the proof we consider the k E (0, 1) case and show that there is no goal incongruence if the principal wants to assign zero or two projects in Period 1 (referred to as Cases 1 and 2, respectively). However, if the principal wants to assign only one project in Period 1 and keep one agent free for Period 2, goal incongruence can arise (Case 3). Case 1. 7FB(Vl, VB; k) = VA + VB. Conditional on V1A and VB, the first-best firm value rFB(VA, VIB; k), is:
Case 1 corresponds to the principal's preferred choice being to undertake both Period-1 projects. Comparing the first and the second terms in (Al) implies MinlVA, V1B > V + 8(k). The right-hand side is the option value of waiting for an agent if he is the only one kept free. Since even that is less than taking on their respective Period-1 projects, both agents prefer undertaking their projects in Period 1. Case 2. 7rFB(ViA, VB; k) = 2V. Case 2 corresponds to the principal's preferred choice being to undertake no Period-1 project.
Comparing the second and the third terms in (Al) implies MaxViA, VB} < V-8(k). Since the agent's option value of waiting is greater than the best Period-1 project (V > MaxtVA, VlB)), each agent prefers not to undertake any project in Period 1. Step i. Suppose Agent A is in charge of project assignment.
From Proposition 2, we know that Agent B is reporting truthfully. Agent A knows that if he does not undertake a project in Period 1, he will have the pick of the projects in Period 2. Hence, Agent A's payoff, denoted 7TA' is: 1TA = Max IVA, k Vj, V + 8(k)}.
The first term corresponds to Agent A undertaking his own Period-i project; the second term is his payoff if he undertakes Agent B's Period-i project; the last term is his option value of waiting. If rTA is not a singleton, the tie is broken as follows. If the tie involves V1JA, Agent A undertakes his own project. If the tie does not involve V1A but involves kV,' and V +85(k), A does not undertake B's project but chooses to wait. This is consistent with Agent A maximizing firm value once he maximizes his own payoff.
If Agent A undertakes a Period-i project, Agent B can be assigned the leftover Period-i project or can be kept free for Period 2. If Agent B is kept free, he is the only agent available in Period 2. If Agent A does not undertake a Period-i project,
